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 Responsibilities for Children in 
Poverty 
 Children in poverty are the victims of severe injustices. They suffer 
from deprivations in important functionings and live, thus, in a state 
of avoidable ill-being and of an increased likelihood of ill-becoming. 
In this chapter, we will now turn our attention to the question of who 
is responsible for securing justice for children in poverty and why. We 
want to examine this question in more detail than just stating that the 
state and its institutions are responsible or that taking care of children is 
primarily a task for the family. We would like to go beyond such simpli-
fied answers and show what kind of responsibilities persons, collectively 
and individually, and institutions, the state and other ones, have and 
for what reasons. The capability approach in general has not dealt often 
with these questions, being first and foremost a theory about the infor-
mation that should be used in comparative quality-of-life assessments. 
It has in particular not engaged with questions of personal responsi-
bility to achieve functionings and capabilities or for closing the door on 
some of them because of bad choices. Ingrid Robeyns has made the same 
observation and traced it back to the focus of the capability approach on 
global and severe poverty. 
 There is a remarkable absence of discussion on issues of responsibility 
in the capability literature, in sharp contrast to political philosophy 
and welfare economics, where this is one of the most important 
lines of debate, certainly since the publication of Dworkin’s work 
on justice and equality. Nevertheless, whether or not one chooses 
to discuss it explicitly, any concrete capability policy proposal can 
be analyzed in terms of the division between personal and collective 
responsibility – but this terminology remains largely absent from the 
capability literature altogether. This may in part be explained by the 
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fact that much of the work on capabilities deals with global poverty, 
where issues of responsibility seem to be less relevant since it would 
seem rather grim to suggest that the world’s most destitute people 
are individually responsible for the respective situations they are in. 
Philosophical puzzles, such as the issue of expensive tastes (for expen-
sive wine, caviar, fast cars, etc.), are simply beyond the radar screen of 
the child labourer or the poor peasant. (Robeyns 2009, 114) 
 Martha Nussbaum, who has expanded the capability approach to a 
minimal (partial) theory of justice, has not as well addressed in much 
depth the question of responsibilities, as a result of the fact that she 
understands the approach as providing guidelines for states to secure 
a minimal dignity of life for its citizens. Related questions of responsi-
bilities beneath or above the state level are not so much her concern, 
and it is unclear how responsibilities between states and beyond state 
borders should be divided to make sure that every human on this planet 
is put above the threshold in the central capabilities she selected in her 
list (Gasper 2006). She has outspokenly rejected the idea of establishing 
a world state but also argued that there is a need for principles of global 
governance, which she understands as thin and decentralized (Nussbaum 
2006). But Nussbaum also agrees – the same applies to Sen and many 
other capability theorists – that it is important to answer questions of 
responsibility. We see two main reasons for that: on the one hand, every 
concept about justice for children should be interested in the means to 
realize it, especially for children who have been shown to fall short of 
what they are entitled to. Our interest in justice is fueled by the hope 
that the clarification of these philosophical issues can also be translated 
into political change and the design of better policies, although we 
know that empirical knowledge that goes far beyond the scope of our 
book is needed to actually do that. On the other hand, every examin-
ation of the responsibilities of different agents of justice will also shed 
some light on the issue that child poverty is a socially produced and 
sustained condition. Child poverty is not natural, not something that 
cannot be changed and overcome, and the examination of responsibil-
ities underpins this claim. It is simply not enough to show that child 
poverty is unjust if this does not lead to coordinated actions; the failure 
to attribute responsibilities to specific people, individually or collect-
ively, or institutions (like the state) may also lead to diffusion, leading 
in the end to no one feeling actually responsible. In addition, we want 
to criticize the common discourse which often blames close caregivers, 
particularly mothers, for the poverty of their children. 
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 It is therefore necessary to try to name and enumerate particular “agents 
of justice” and to discuss on what grounds responsibilities can be attrib-
uted to them (O’Neill 2001; Deveaux 2013). One core question always 
concerns the relation between these agents of justice and the victims of 
the injustices in question. Why are some people, whether individually or 
as group, or some institutions responsible for changing and enhancing 
the living condition of others? In which way do they need to be connected 
to each other? For example, by living together in a country (as particu-
larists would claim), or is it enough that they are simply other humans 
sharing one world (the cosmopolitans’ position; Brock and Moellendorf 
2005)? Our account is not explicitly particularist or cosmopolitan – there 
are, moreover, so many versions of these two out there that it is hard 
to define them neatly – since we will attribute some responsibilities to 
the state and some, although far less so, to international institutions. In 
the case of child poverty in modern welfare states, the debate between 
particularism and cosmopolitanism is not so important for us: First, most 
controversies are concerned with how much responsibility can be laid 
upon richer states (and the people living within them) to support poorer 
states (and the people living within them) because the latter are over-
burdened or in a much poorer position to alleviate poverty themselves. 
In the case of welfare states, it is obvious that they are powerful, at least 
much more so than poorer states; it would not be fair to ask poorer states 
to contribute and support richer states in order to alleviate child poverty 
within them. The issue of child poverty is always an issue of redistribu-
tion within rich countries and only to a very limited extent between rich 
countries, although the economic crisis of the last years in Europe poses 
some questions in that regard (e.g., the support of Greece and Spain by 
richer countries in the EU), but we will leave these questions aside. The 
second important point in the discussion between particularists and 
cosmopolitans refers to the nature of the relations between richer and 
poorer countries. Some scholars, most prominently Thomas Pogge, claim 
that the first harm the second via one-sided trade agreements (Pogge 
2007). Virtually no one would claim that the opposite is the case and 
that poorer states have any substantial responsibilities towards richer 
states because they would unjustly gain an advantage over them. Thirdly, 
many particularists claim that the social relations within a state are of 
particular importance to justify justice and responsibilities attached to it. 
They conclude that, due to the social basis of justice, cosmopolitanism is 
not well justified. Whether or not one supports this view, child poverty 
in welfare states is without a doubt an issue that has to be tackled by that 
very state, the state and its citizens having some responsibilities. The 
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fourth issue concerns rights and institutions: there exist no social policy 
institutions on the global level and no functioning legal framework that 
would guarantee social protection from poverty. This is a major obstacle, 
and while most cosmopolitans argue that such global institutions are 
needed, most particularists contend that they will not succeed for various 
reasons. In the case of child poverty in welfare states, the situation looks 
different. Here we have states which all have at least some kind of social 
policy in place; social protection and poverty alleviation is embedded 
in certain social rights directly granted to families in poverty or chil-
dren in poverty. It is therefore much less necessary to debate whether 
global institutions are feasible and if so, in which form. Although we 
support the view that child poverty in welfare states is best tackled by 
changing the international and global institutions, most of the work 
needs to be done in welfare states themselves in terms of designing and 
implementing more inclusive social policies and allotting enough funds 
to support poor children and their caregivers. It seems likely that cosmo-
politans and particularists will come to very similar conclusions in regard 
to child poverty in welfare states, both probably agreeing to some extent 
that its alleviation is first an issue of social justice within a rich state (or a 
community of them, like the EU) and that global justice is not primarily 
concerned with it. The reduction of child poverty in richer countries is 
part of an ideal of global justice but not its primary problem. 
 Our own account will analyze the relation different agents have to 
children in poverty, and we will then try to attribute responsibilities 
based on a set of morally relevant criteria; in this sense, we will defend 
what the literature calls an agent-centered approach (Deveaux 2013; 
O’Neill 2001). Instead of focusing on one or two important agents, like 
the state and the family, we wish to distinguish more of them, including 
those with limited responsibilities. Furthermore, we wish to emphasize 
that there are some very important agents who often get neglected in 
theories of responsibilities; in this context, we point to peers and enter-
prises, for instance, which raise particularly challenging questions for 
the concept of responsibilities towards children affected by poverty. All 
this leads to the conclusion that child poverty is not only a social policy 
issue but touches many policy areas: the labor market, public infrastruc-
ture, health care, education. 
 Before we outline our own theory, let us briefly comment on one of the 
few philosophical debates that has emerged on the topic of responsibilities 
towards children and why we connect our argument only loosely to it and 
build it mainly on other approaches to responsibilities which have not so 
far addressed the specific case of children. The debate we have in mind 
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addresses whether there is a responsibility among all adult members of a 
society (parents and nonparents alike) to share the costs arising from having 
children and parenting (George 1987; Vallentyne 2002; Casal and Williams 
2004; Olsaretti 2013). This issue is a matter of controversy in the literature, 
but there seems to be a good argument in favor of the pro-sharing argu-
ment in terms of the contributions children make, on average and in the 
long run, to the welfare of a society. Most children will become taxpayers, 
support the older generations and therefore create a general benefit for the 
society in question. This again makes it reasonable that those benefiting 
from the fact that there are enough children in their society (independent 
from other relationships they have to them) have duties to secure adequate 
conditions for their upbringing (Olsaretti 2013). But for the purposes of this 
chapter, where responsibilities towards children in poverty are the focus, 
we see only limited use for this line of reasoning, first and foremost for two 
reasons. First, the responsibilities debate typically takes place in the realm 
of ideal theories of justice, assuming that having and bringing up children 
happens against fair background conditions. Such strong assumptions help 
to get to a high degree of philosophical clarity; however, it is often difficult 
to say what the arguments imply for nonideal circumstances (Sen 2009). 
We do not want to suggest that this is an impossible or useless enterprise. 
We prefer to situate our approach to responsibilities from the beginning 
in nonideal circumstances; this better fits the general orientation of our 
theory. The second, related reason is a general worry about the strategy of 
grounding moral responsibilities for children (struck by poverty or not) 
onto other agents than their parents primarily on their being “public” 
or “socialized” goods. Especially in contexts where it is unclear if some 
groups of children (e.g., those living in poverty or those with disabilities 
or chronic illnesses) will be able to contribute economically to a society it 
seems to follow from such a perspective that no one but the parents has 
a responsibility, which is an indefensible conclusion. As will become clear 
later on, one ground for attributing responsibilities to an agent is that she 
benefits from a certain situation. But this is only one aspect of a theory of 
responsibilities, and there are others which are relevant for the injustice 
of child poverty and which do not get discussed comprehensively in the 
philosophical debates just mentioned. 
 3.1 Attributing responsibilities to agents of justice 
 There are many different ways of attributing responsibilities to agents 
of justice. We begin by discussing the approach of Iris Young. In 
 Responsibilities for Justice , she distinguishes two models of responsibilities 
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(Young 2011). First, there is the liability model, which can be roughly 
described by means of two components. It (a) connects responsibility 
with directly  causing harmful outcomes and (b) assigns responsibil-
ities only to agents who perform the action in question voluntarily 
and with adequate knowledge of the situation. The liability model is 
the dominant one in legal reasoning, and it can also be considered the 
standard account of moral responsibility found in ethical theory. In this 
model, it is clear that responsibilities are assigned to concrete agents; 
there is, from this point of view, no problem for the agent-centered 
approach we want to develop. Difficulties arise, however, when we are 
confronted with structural injustices, where the causal relationships of 
causing harms are often diffuse. As Young argues, such structural injus-
tices are often the result of numerous uncoordinated individual actions, 
which, taken one by one, cannot always be deemed morally problem-
atic. Taken together, however, they might lead to consequences that 
impose significant constraints on many members of society, leading to 
inequality and poverty. 
 We can easily imagine the story of a child, Sabrina, living with her 
single mother in London. The mother, let’s call her Anne, is not well 
educated and has to make a living from insecure low-wage service jobs. 
She would like to give Sabrina a good education and a life in a calm 
neighborhood, but she struggles to pay the rent for her small flat in one 
of the most dangerous areas in London, and Sabrina has to go to a public 
school with a bad reputation. Anne spends a lot of time working and, 
due to health problems, is increasingly worried about how long she will 
be able to keep up the current situation; it is likely that things will get 
worse in the future, leading to feelings of despair and helplessness. Her 
daughter is often on her own, neglecting her schoolwork and having 
trouble developing aspirations for her future. Many more aspects of their 
situation would surely be relevant for an analysis of poverty, but what 
is important here is that it might be difficult for Anne and Sabrina to 
blame particular individuals for their difficult circumstances. Of course, 
it is possible that they are confronted with greedy and abusive employers 
and landlords, who try to take advantage of their lack of options, or with 
biased teachers who are convinced that children of single mothers will 
never be able to get to respectable academic achievements. But it is also 
conceivable that they usually find helpful persons who understand their 
situation and are willing to support them: teachers who put in an extra 
effort to motivate Sabrina or landlords who don’t have a problem if the 
rent is not always paid on time, for instance. Still, despite these morally 
praiseworthy actions and attitudes, something surely has gone wrong, 
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something that cannot directly be explained by how individuals behave 
in direct interactions with them. Anne’s and Sabrina’s lives are charac-
terized by what Young sees as  structural injustice . 
 Structural injustice [ ... ] exists when social processes put large groups 
of persons under systematic threat of domination or deprivation of 
the means to develop and exercise their capacities, at the same time 
that these processes enable others to dominate or to have a wide range 
of opportunities for developing and exercising capacities available to 
them. Structural injustice is a kind of moral wrong distinct from the 
wrongful action of an individual agent or the repressive policies of a 
state. Structural injustice occurs as a consequence of many individ-
uals and institutions acting to pursue their particular goals and inter-
ests, for the most part within the limits of accepted rules and norms. 
(Young 2011, 52) 
 For such contexts in which structural injustices exist, Young introduces 
a second account of responsibilities: the social connection model. Here, 
the central idea is that everyone participating in and contributing to 
structural processes that lead to unjust outcomes shares responsibilities 
for these injustices, even if they do not intentionally act to create the 
respective harms. Not being at fault in such a sense is not enough to be 
exempt from responsibilities. These responsibilities are essentially polit-
ical, demanding that everyone takes steps towards the transformation of 
unjust structures. Unlike the liability model, which is first and foremost 
backward looking and focuses on the identification of those who are 
actively and directly involved in causing harm, the social connection 
model focuses on the future and the importance of joint actions. On this 
account, it is not enough that a citizen follows acceptable norms and 
rules of moral conduct if she wants to be absolved from responsibilities. 
As long as the society in which she lives possesses unjust background 
conditions, she is called upon to go beyond her own interests and work 
towards a fairer society. There are also good reasons to weight the respon-
sibilities stemming from such a social connection model differently for 
different agents. In one way or another, almost every member of society 
contributes with her purchasing decisions, preferences on the job market 
or education choices to a social order with immense inequalities and 
asymmetries of power. It is, however, surely necessary to rank weights of 
responsibilities according to a variety of reasons. It is exactly here where 
an agent-centered approach fits the social connection model. Young 
introduces four different grounds, or “parameters of reasoning”, as she 
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calls them, which are relevant for balancing and weighing responsibil-
ities: power, privilege, interest and collective ability. They are related to 
the social position of an agent and can be used to identify the kinds and 
degrees of responsibilities different agents – individual and collective 
ones – have to confront structural injustices. 
 Power is relevant because agents are positioned differently in the social 
structure and have varying options for actions at their disposal. Leading 
politicians or CEOs of big companies are much closer to processes 
producing unjust outcomes and in positions to influence them than 
the unemployed or people with low-wage jobs at the company’s bottom 
rank. As a consequence, it is sensible to connect an agent’s power with 
her responsibilities. Furthermore, responsibilities should be connected 
to structural processes an agent effectively can influence. It makes no 
sense to demand actions and behaviors that are not within the reach of 
an individual; it would even go against the basic moral principle that 
“ought implies can”. 
 The category of power can be joined with two other influential ways 
of reasoning about responsibilities and duties. The first is the ability-
to-pay principle, which is highly prominent in particular in the design 
of tax systems (Gaisbauer, Schweiger and Sedmak 2013) and in recent 
discussions about climate change (Page 2008). It states that the burden 
of taxation – or any other burden – should be distributed according 
to the ability to carry the burden and to contribute to the solution of 
the problem. The ability-to-pay principle is hence often used to justify 
progressive taxation, where not only the absolute amount of taxes but 
also the tax rate itself increases according to income or wealth. Three 
distinct reasons support this principle: First, the ability-to-pay principle 
rests on the idea of the decreasing utility of wealth and income and 
that every taxpayer should make about the same sacrifice. For example, 
person A earns €1,000 per month and person B earns €5,000 per month; 
both live in Germany. If both have to pay the same amount in taxes, say 
€200, it is obvious that the living standard of person A is heavily affected 
while that of person B is nearly untouched. The case is slightly different 
if both have to pay the same tax rate; for example, 20 percent. Person A 
would again have to pay €200 and person B €1,000, but it can be argued 
that the living standard of person A is still more affected and decreased 
than that of person B. Many tax systems hence favor a progressive 
taxation, one that would make person A pay 10 percent of her income, 
which would be €100, and person B 30 percent, or €1,500. Still, the idea 
of marginal utility suggests that the €100 in taxes are maybe an even 
bigger sacrifice for person A than the €1,500 paid by person B, which is 
126 A Philosophical Examination of Social Justice and Child Poverty
a reason in favor of even higher progressive taxes. The system, however, 
already seems to be fairer than one with a “flat tax”. 
 Second, the ability-to-pay principle assumes that it generates more 
resources and funds. The total income of the persons A and B is €6,000, 
and if both paid the same absolute amount of taxes, say €200, the 
total income for the state would be €400; a tax rate of 20 percent that 
applied to both would amount to €1,200, and a progressive tax rate 
based on the ability-to-pay principle would amount to €1,600 without 
harming either A or B to an unjustifiable extent. We are aware that the 
ability-to-pay principle has its friends and foes, but we think there are 
good reasons to use it to assign responsibilities for injustices like child 
poverty: those who are able to contribute more should contribute more. 
A third supporting reason for progressive attribution of burdens based 
on the ability-to-pay principle is that it decreases inequalities. Before 
taxes, B had five times more income than person A, but after taxes, the 
inequality decreased to a ratio of about 1 to 4. 
 Another prominent principle connected to the idea of power was 
introduced by Onora O’Neill in her important article on agents of justice 
(O’Neill 2001). There she distinguished between primary and secondary 
agents of justice: primary agents have the power to assign duties and 
responsibilities to secondary agents and are in a position to use coercive 
measures if secondary agents do not comply with their duties. O’Neill 
had in mind that states are typically powerful primary agents. If they are 
weak or have failed altogether, however, as often happens in states where 
absolute poverty is prevalent, she argues that international and global 
institutions have to take on this role. However, in such cases, which are 
typical for the global poverty discourse and where conflicting interests 
exist between states, it is extremely difficult to identify institutions that 
should be seen as powerful primary agents of justice. Since we focus on 
child poverty in rich welfare states in this book, the situation is clearer 
and her argument has more force. In general, these states operate quite 
well, have command over a lot of funds and resources and the power 
to enforce most of their laws. Sometimes their powers are restricted, of 
course, but they definitely fit O’Neill’s definition of primary agents of 
justice. Hence, they have the power to set up institutions and rules that 
help to achieve justice or that can significantly influence and mobilize 
other, weaker agents – in many different contexts and particularly 
regarding structural injustices. Rich states – or in the case of Europe, the 
European Union – can introduce binding laws and policies and there-
fore provide standards that come up to the demands of social justice. 
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 There are other agents that hold considerable power over others as 
well and thus possess at least some features of primary agents of justice. 
Companies, for example, have the power to hold suppliers respon-
sible for producing under fair conditions or to provide incentives for 
employees to support the local community and do charity work. The 
wealthy members of a society often have greater influence on policies 
than the “normal” voter; it makes therefore a big difference if they lobby 
exclusively for their own interests or instead support measures empow-
ering the weaker members of society. The media constitute another 
agent, one which is often forgotten but has some real power in terms of 
influence and shaping the discourse about and attitudes towards poverty. 
It supplies people with information they have to trust and influences 
policies in campaigning for or against it. The media cannot hold anyone 
responsible for what they do or how they think about poverty, but as 
they certainly influence public opinion, they are an important agent of 
justice. 
 There are also those who benefit and who are able to live comfortable 
lives due to, for instance, the economic order of a society or the world 
as such. According to Young, such  privileges also confer responsibilities: 
those who benefit from unjust structures are morally obliged to initiate 
change. Furthermore, privileged agents can usually adapt their lifestyles 
without jeopardizing their well-being, something that also adds to their 
responsibilities. Privilege  often goes hand in hand with positions of 
power, yet this is not necessarily the case. In industrialized countries, for 
instance, broad parts of the population benefit from unjust international 
trade relations; at the same time, their power to directly alter them is 
limited and difficult to grasp. Nevertheless, their privileged position 
per se grants them special responsibilities. Of course, a full account of 
responsibilities must also look at the variety of privileges within indus-
trialized countries, which collectively profit from an unjust global order; 
there is definitely a hierarchy of privileges, and in varying degrees they 
are connected to different forms and forces of responsibilities. 
 This idea of privileges is close to the beneficiary principle (Butt 2014; 
Page 2012), which can be interpreted in at least four different ways. (1) 
People or institutions have certain responsibilities to victims of injus-
tices insofar as they voluntarily benefited from injustices as a result of 
a wrongdoing they were at least part of. In this case, the beneficiary 
principle is closely connected to Young’s liability model: the ones 
held responsible here benefited from an injustice which they at least 
partially caused, and the beneficiary principle only adds another argu-
ment. (2) People or institutions have certain responsibilities to victims 
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of injustices insofar as they involuntarily benefited from injustices as a 
result of wrongdoing they were at least part of. In this case, the one held 
responsible did something wrong but did not intend to benefit from the 
wrongdoing. For example, a company may cheat a family out of its farm 
in order to build a factory on that land, only to discover that beneath 
the land there is oil, a fact they were unaware of. Extracting the oil will 
be much more profitable than building the plant. (3) People or institu-
tions have certain responsibilities to victims of injustices insofar as they 
involuntarily benefited from the injustices as a result of a wrongdoing 
they were not part of. In this case, someone is held responsible even 
though she did nothing unjust and wrong and did not even intend to 
benefit from it; it “accidentally” happens to her. For instance, someone 
buys a house in a cheap area; after some time a rich company comes 
and pressures most other owners to leave. It develops the area, leading 
to an increase in the value of all houses there. A person who stayed in 
her house, unaware of what was going on, certainly did not plan that 
to happen and did not intend to profit; she simply stayed because it 
was her home and the general situation allowed her to. Is she in any 
way responsible for undoing this wrong or providing compensation – 
for example, by giving money to the families that had to leave? (4) 
People or institutions have certain responsibilities to victims of injus-
tices insofar as they voluntarily benefited from injustices as a result of 
wrongdoing they were no part of. For example, a person knows that a 
company is going to develop a neighborhood and that it will use illegal 
and immoral means to achieve that; she then buys a house in that area 
to profit from this wrongdoing. 
 How should we evaluate these examples from a moral point of view? 
Does it matter if someone benefited voluntarily or involuntarily or if she 
played a part in the origination of the injustice from which she bene-
fited? The first case, because of its closeness to the liability model, is not 
very controversial. Causing voluntarily an injustice one benefits from 
clearly confers a strong responsibility to the respective agent. The second 
case is mainly relevant for the extent of the responsibility in question. It 
seems reasonable that a company is responsible not only for giving back 
the land but also for paying part of the profit it made exploiting the oil. 
The beneficiary principle in this case extends the company’s obligation. 
The fourth case seems also easy to accept, since one can argue here that 
the beneficiary took part in something she knew to be wrong, even if 
she did not dirty her hands directly. The trickiest case is certainly (3): 
should someone, without doing anything wrong and without intending 
to benefit, be held responsible? On what grounds can that be? The cases 
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can be made more complicated if certain background information is 
added: For instance, the house owner who profits from the wrongdoing 
of the company planned to do the same and already established a sham 
firm but was just a few days late. Or the company is owned by the house 
owner’s brother, who wanted to help raise the house’s market value 
without telling him. In these two cases, most would agree that the house 
owner is in some sort of way responsible for trying to undo the wrong 
that happened, even though it is highly unclear how he can succeed in 
doing that. Similar examples, on a smaller scale and involving the loss 
or benefit of no more than US$1,000, have been discussed by Daniel 
Butt, who concludes that the beneficiary principle should not be legally 
enforceable on the individual level but can play an important role on 
the level of institutions or collectives, helping these types of agents 
determine responsibilities based on an evaluation of how much they 
benefited (Butt 2014). The beneficiary principle of case (3) responds to a 
certain moral intuition to owe something to those from whose suffering 
one benefits but whose extent is still to be determined. Obviously the 
house owner is neither obliged to sell his house at the higher market 
price nor give the funds to his wronged neighbors. He might, however, 
be responsible for helping them sue the company. Thus, we deal here 
with a responsibility that should not be legally enforceable but still has 
moral weight. 
 We have discussed the beneficiary principle in relation to concrete 
injustices or wrongs that happen to other persons. But as Young suggests, 
its moral force also applies to cases of structural injustices, where it is very 
difficult to disentangle who benefits and who does something wrong. 
The case of Anne and Sabrina, presented as an illustration of structural 
injustice, makes this clear. We can think of an employer, for example, 
who will give Sabrina a job in the future. He pays her a very low salary 
because of her bad education, and she has to work in precarious condi-
tions. The employer thus profits from an injustice that happened long 
before he takes advantage of poor Sabrina. He might not even intend 
to exploit her but is pressured by shareholders interested in high profit. 
He might sincerely think that giving her a low-wage job is better than 
no job at all, since she will at least be able to pay her bills and keep 
her apartment. Still, he benefits from the mere existence of people in 
vulnerable positions in the labor market, forced to take any job they 
get. Consumers who buy low-priced products because of the exploit-
ation of Sabrina’s labor benefit as well. Assuming that they do not know 
that she works under harsh conditions, what responsibilities should be 
given them? This small example illustrates how child poverty is, in fact, 
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beneficial for many people. Some of them know about the relationships 
and voluntarily take advantage of it, but there are many others who are 
unaware and would even oppose it if they knew what was happening. 
 Another relevant ground for distributing different kinds and degrees of 
responsibilities is captured by Young with the term  interests . Challenging 
unjust social structures will have a positive effect on certain groups – 
first and foremost (but not exclusively) on those who are negatively 
affected by the current inequalities and imbalances of power. It is in 
their interest that injustices are remedied and that the society they live 
in becomes a fairer one. Hence, they should also play an active part in 
these transformations; indeed, a social connection model sees them as 
agents of justice who bear responsibility for their own situation. One 
must, of course, proceed with caution here so as not to overburden 
the least advantaged members of society, attributing their weak social 
position to their own failure. But without their involvement, dedica-
tion and struggles for recognition, it is unlikely that improvements will 
occur. Furthermore, their firsthand knowledge and experience of the 
harms they suffer puts them in an epistemologically privileged position; 
it, too, generates certain responsibilities. In the case of child poverty, it 
is clear that there is also a wider interest of society and the state to alle-
viate it because of the many social and economic problems it creates. 
A society’s interest is in having children grow up to become healthy, 
productive members; this way, they are able to care for themselves and 
their own children with little state support, from which a society bene-
fits as a whole. The fight against child poverty should, hence, be driven 
by a state interest to keep the subsequent costs of benefits, unemploy-
ment, medical care and the like low. 
 Monique Deveaux has argued in a similar vein that most agent-cen-
tered approaches, in particular that of Thomas Pogge, focus on powerful 
agents and on institutions either on the national or international level 
(in questions of global poverty) and that this focus neglects the contri-
bution of the poor themselves to overcoming their poverty (Deveaux 
2013). They are conceptualized mainly as beneficiaries with very limited 
power or none at all to contribute to poverty alleviation and the realiza-
tion of justice. 
 On this framing, the designated moral agents are specifically persons 
and entities not suffering from poverty but rather responsible for 
contributing to that poverty, or thought to be capable of alleviating it 
(or both). By contrast, the would-be recipients are construed as mere 
recipients of justice, rather than as potential agents of change. [ ... ] 
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In the absence of adequate attention to perspectives and needs of the 
putative recipients of poverty reduction efforts, a focus on agents’ 
duties and capabilities risks marginalizing the role of poor communi-
ties in devising and implementing solutions to chronic poverty and 
inequality. By failing to see the poor as actual or prospective agents of 
justice, such approaches risk ignoring the root political causes of, and 
best remedies for, entrenched poverty. (Deveaux 2013, 23–24) 
 Deveaux uses the concept of agents of justice for all who can and 
should have an active role in the process of fighting injustice. This is 
further supported by insights provided by participatory approaches to 
poverty and pro-poor initiatives, as well as research on ways to empower 
the poor by taking them seriously (Drydyk 2013; Chambers 2008). 
Conceptualizing the poor as agents of justice is empowering; it acknow-
ledges that they still have the capacity to alter their lives and that they 
are not completely dominated. Furthermore, such a view entails that 
there is a responsibility on the side of other agents of justice to provide 
poor people with the means and resources – in capability terms, conver-
sion factors – they need to make choices, acquire capabilities and realize 
functionings. In the case of child poverty, children themselves have an 
interest in not being poor and not suffering from severe deprivation in 
functioning; young children, however, cannot articulate that interest, 
and older children typically do not understand the breadth and depth of 
the problems they face and their long-term consequences. Consequently, 
the main beneficiaries in the battle against child poverty are, in this 
sense, the weakest agents, who are at least to some extent dependent 
on others who advocate their interests and claim justice for them. That 
is, it seems, a central difference between children and adults in poverty. 
Poor adults are often treated like children, which is humiliating and 
degrading, while children are actually able to act as agents of justice for 
themselves only to a limited extent. This does not mean that children 
should be treated as objects without agency or the ability to express 
some of their interests; but some kind of paternalism is usually justified 
and needed in order to protect their interests. Again, it is very difficult to 
draw a line from what age, on a child’s view, should be taken as authori-
tative; the context is certainly relevant to an adequate answer to that 
question. Especially for younger children, it is very likely that those who 
have the strongest interest in realizing justice for them are not the chil-
dren themselves but their parents, families or other caregivers who have 
a close bond to them. They should have at least such a strong interest as 
part of their parental responsibilities. 
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 One additional important issue is connected to the idea of interest 
as a ground for attributing responsibilities to agents of justice: adap-
tive preferences. We have already argued that adaptive preferences are 
normal during childhood and that development during childhood itself 
is always an adaption to the environment in which one grows up and 
lives. No child is in a position to choose these things autonomously, 
naturally coming to terms with her situation. This is one of the reasons 
why functionings, not capabilities, are to be preferred as units of justice 
for children: it is simply unreasonable to emphasize freedom of choice 
when the agent in question has only very limited knowledge and experi-
ence of what she is choosing. Hence, the normative core of adaptive 
preferences is tricky to catch in the case of children, because it seems as 
if, from an objective (adult) point of view, children often tend to alter 
preferences based on what is made available to them by adults. Children 
sometimes neglect injustices happening to them; in extreme cases they 
still love and bond with abusive parents and view themselves as respon-
sible for the parents’ behavior. Adaptive preferences can also affect the 
parents and other caregivers who directly interact with the child daily. 
Parents can have adaptive preferences in the sense that they do not want 
their children to be educated or that they neglect their health issues. 
Here, the issue of parental autonomy, parental rights and duties and 
the responsibility of other agents of justice to interfere becomes crucial; 
we will come back to this later, when we discuss the responsibilities 
of parents and caregivers. For now, we highlight that the idea to put 
responsibilities on the poor as agents of justice always faces the diffi-
culty that those who should have the most interest in overcoming an 
injustice often support its existence. In such cases, it might be justified 
to neglect the choices of the poor and to enforce certain changes, even if 
it goes against their will. Expert-driven poverty alleviation is sometimes 
necessary, and in the case of children, even justified. They certainly 
cannot be expected to always make the right choices and know what is 
best for them in order to reach justice. 
 Finally, Young argues that  collective abilities are relevant. Fighting 
structural injustices is usually a matter of joint actions. Individuals 
have to work in a coordinated way in order to effect change. There 
are typically networks and groups concerned with questions of social 
justice – NGOs, trade unions, several faith-based organizations – but 
universities and other educational institutions also unite many individ-
uals. Consequently, their structures can be used to initiate or maintain 
movements aimed at undermining structural injustices. Their collective 
abilities provide a very helpful starting point, and it is reasonable to 
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suggest that this particular characteristic puts them in a position where 
special obligations arise. 
 In summary, it is crucial for both the liability model and the social 
connection model of responsibilities to identify  specific agents of justice . 
The liability model puts the focus on the intended causation of harm 
(or the knowing omission of an act causing harm); it is predominantly 
backward looking and suitable to circumstances where the causal rela-
tionships are clear and where agents who deliberately and knowingly 
bring about and keep up morally untenable outcomes can be located. 
The social connection model, in contrast, starts from the assumption 
that many injustices cannot be grasped in this way, because causal rela-
tionships are blurry and those contributing to and upholding unjust 
social structures have no bad intentions. It suggests, however, that there 
are different grounds for attributing different agents with different 
kinds and degrees of responsibilities, depending on their social posi-
tions. According to Young, primarily the categories of power, privilege, 
interests and collective abilities can be used to decide who actually has 
which responsibilities to act. 
 We think Young’s model provides a very helpful way of looking at 
responsibilities for justice. However, making it fit the special issues we 
are concerned with in this book requires some additional consider-
ations. The model has to be extended and refined in some parts for our 
purpose of identifying grounds relevant to assigning responsibilities for 
acting against child poverty. Let us start by adding another ground, one 
Young touches on only superficially, one rooted in every child’s depend-
ency on love, care and respectively close relationships. We separate the 
interest of someone that child poverty should be alleviated and over-
come from the relation to the child and the particular responsibility 
that stems from being a parent or close caregiver, having the duty and 
right of parenting. Young seems less concerned with close relations and 
how they influence the kind of responsibilities we have. We have argued 
that her grounds can and should also guide attribution of responsibil-
ities in contexts where the connection between an agent of justice and 
those who benefit is less blurred. Child poverty, as we have often said, 
is almost always family poverty, and parents have a major influence 
on their children. Parents, however, do not only have such an influ-
ence, their poverty does not only cause their children to be poor as 
well; they have different kinds of relations, which are constituted by 
being a family. Parents have some rights but certainly also responsibil-
ities towards their children; some of them can be caught by using the 
grounds discussed before. This does not, however, apply to all of them. 
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The fact of being close to the child, the fact that the child is attached to 
her parents, which is essential to the child’s development, constitutes 
another strong ground for responsibility. Children depend on having 
caregivers and being parented – whether by their biological parents or a 
different person – and it has been shown that continuity of care matters 
heavily. Parents and caregivers have thus a responsibility solely based on 
the relation they have to these children, a relation that cannot be broken 
without causing serious harm. So to our existing list of four grounds on 
which an agent can be held responsible, we add a new one: the relation 
of a child being attached to this agent and depending on her to continue 
to care and take on some responsibility. 
 The different grounds for attributing responsibility have produced 
different variations of understanding responsibility. In the liability 
model it is closely tied to causing an injustice; the social connection 
model attributes responsibility on other grounds, but it is unclear what 
this means exactly. Does responsibility of an agent of justice imply that 
she is to blame? Does it imply that she has the duty to act, a duty that 
can be enforced by others (primary agents of justice)? How is responsi-
bility tied to autonomy and choice, hence the ability to do something 
different, and how is it related to knowledge and the ability to know 
about the result of one’s actions, participating in a web of social rela-
tions that are structurally unjust? And what do we want to do with these 
five grounds? Can they help us rank agents of justice and their respon-
sibilities, for instance? Answering these questions is our aim in what 
follows. 
 An agent of justice is, so we suggest, responsible if any of the five 
criteria discussed above can be applied, with two refinements. On the 
one hand we need to consider knowledge; that is, what an agent of 
justice has known or could have known with reasonable effort about the 
results of her actions or the structural injustices she helps to create. The 
grounds presented by Young, which we also endorse, suggest that not 
knowing does not mean no responsibilities exist, though it can reduce 
the responsibility one has. On the other hand we need to put more 
weight on choice and if an agent might have acted differently or did act 
differently in the future. The ability to act differently in the past, that is, 
in creation of an injustice, is important. Nevertheless, the possibility on 
the part of the agent to alter her actions now and in the future, undoing 
the injustice or at least helping something change for the better, counts 
as well. It seems that agents are completely free of responsibilities only if 
two things can be shown: First, if they did not participate in any actions 
that led to an injustice or helped create or sustain a structurally unjust 
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context; and second, if they did not benefit in any way from the exist-
ence of an injustice and were in no position to alter their actions in a 
way that would create more justice. Applied to child poverty in welfare 
states, this means that basically everyone – except for people with severe 
disabilities or dementia or in coma or for (young) children – has some 
sort of responsibility and should therefore act to counter child poverty. 
 Young uses the grounds she specifies under the social connection 
model to specifically address injustices which are structural. In these 
circumstances, it is very unclear who is directly or causally responsible 
for the existence of a harm, making it virtually impossible to attribute 
responsibilities on the basis of the liability model. Child poverty is 
certainly such an issue; it is to a large extent a structural injustice rooted 
in the cultural, social, political and economic order of a society. It is 
upheld and reproduced by the way capitalistic societies work and how 
they are supported by nearly all people living within them, directly 
or indirectly, voluntarily or involuntarily. There is nearly no way to 
escape these social connections besides moving to a detached island 
and cutting off all contact to the outside; but doing many little things 
differently can make a difference: voting for another party, supporting 
the state and its institutions, not avoiding taxes, buying clean clothes, 
doing some community work and supporting those who are let down 
by the state via charity, paying fair prices and – if one is an employer – 
fair wages. Such actions and behaviors have an effect on poverty and 
on how it affects children. These effects are often indirect, but it is still 
important to anchor moral responsibilities in these “small” domains. 
If many people come up to these demands, important changes will be 
seen. 
 We want to use these grounds to assign responsibilities to agents of 
justice where the causal relation of causing an injustice is simply unclear. 
These are the cases Young developed her model for, and we follow her in 
this respect. At the same time, we wish to suggest that they also apply to 
cases where agents of justice have a more direct relation to the victims of 
injustices than just via taking part in a context of structural injustice. As 
Young presents the liability model, only those who willingly and know-
ingly cause an injustice should be held responsible; we believe this to be 
too narrow. Those who cause an injustice directly but unwillingly and/
or unknowingly should be held responsible, though to a lesser extent. As 
we saw in discussing the beneficiary principle, doing something invol-
untarily and/or unknowingly does not let one off the hook. Moreover, 
there are many cases in which agents of justice are not far away from the 
victims of injustice. In the case of global justice, where relations between 
136 A Philosophical Examination of Social Justice and Child Poverty
people living in rich states and poor states are discussed, arguing with 
closeness is usually beside the point. Thousands of kilometers separate 
them, and often no emotional bonds are present at all. In the case of 
child poverty in welfare states, however, many possible agents of justice 
interact directly with the child and influence her well-being and well-be-
coming, both directly and indirectly, through contributing to structural 
injustices within which child poverty is embedded. We therefore argue 
that these four grounds – power (we will later show that this includes 
the ability to take collective action), interest, privilege and closeness – 
together with the main ground of the liability model, causation, are all 
relevant in attributing responsibilities. 
 In a nutshell, there are many different ways in which agents of justice 
can be directly or indirectly connected to the existence and susten-
ance of child poverty and what it does to children. People can have 
many different relationships to children in poverty, and we suggest that 
this position in the child’s “environment” matters for the attribution 
of responsibilities. This category of closeness, the specific nature of the 
relation to the victims of injustice, can be implicitly found in all other 
grounds. An agent’s power to help can increase if she is closer to victims 
of injustice and is able to provide direct help (e.g., providing shelter for 
a homeless child). Likewise, the benefits gained through an unjust situ-
ation can also depend on the closeness (e.g., an employer who exploits 
a single mother benefits more from doing so than the middle-class man 
who buys the cheap clothes produced by the company to save money). 
It is also reasonable to think that state institutions such as social welfare 
departments and their employees have particular responsibilities due to 
their professional relation to families in poverty and the power they 
have to influence their lives; the responsibility to treat everyone in a fair 
way and with due respect certainly falls into this category. A neighbor 
not detecting that a child is maltreated or undernourished can be excus-
able, but if a social worker fails to do so, something is certainly wrong 
(either because the social worker is just not good at her job or because 
the state failed to provide the working conditions and resources she 
needed to do it). 
 Such a broad concept of responsibility as we endorse here makes clear 
that everyone has some share of responsibility; we cannot just lie back 
and say that it is not our problem, that others have to solve it. But there 
is danger involved, too; if everyone is responsible, this easily leads to the 
conclusion that, in the end, no one is, shifting the responsibility back 
to the “usual suspects”: the state and the families these poor children 
grow up in. We are well aware of this problem; using the grounds we laid 
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out to clarify and help identify concrete agents of justice and determine 
their responsibility is what is needed. In the best case, it would even be 
possible to determine what has to be done. We will not be able to go into 
these details here, but we will propose a first model of how these five 
grounds should be ranked and weighed against each other. 
 Our proposal is vague to some extent, in that we cannot attach exact 
numbers to each ground and then calculate a given agent’s responsi-
bility based on that. Notwithstanding, we will be more specific than 
most other models are, going far beyond just saying that each and every 
ground has the same normative force and leaving it wide open which 
agents should be held responsible. 
 The strongest reason for being responsible as an agent of justice is if 
an injustice is caused and upheld willingly and knowingly, even if this 
happened due to negligence. It seems uncontroversial that such a causal 
role carries strong responsibility for the agent in question; in fact, this 
reasoning motivates the liability model. By holding someone respon-
sible we mean that she is the first one to whom the victims of injustice 
can go and claim that the injustice should be undone or compensated. 
The respective responsibilities are therefore not only backward looking, 
as Young’s interpretation of the liability model suggests. They have a 
forward-looking component as well and demand that actions be taken 
to improve the situation in the future. 
 Second to that is power, especially the power to be a primary agent 
and to create institutions and hold other agents responsible. If an agent 
can help undo an injustice (with reasonable effort, be it noted), she 
should do so even if she did not cause it. Third on the list is the rela-
tion a certain agent has to the child, in particular if it is a caring rela-
tion, which is essential for the child. We put this high on the list simply 
because of the particular needs and vulnerabilities of children. Fourth 
in our ranking is gaining privileges and benefiting from the existence 
of an injustice. The fifth and weakest reason to be held responsible is to 
have an interest in overcoming the injustice, in particular if the interest 
stems from being a victim of this injustice oneself. Let us support this 
ranking with an example. Consider a family with three children that 
is pushed into and held in poverty because of the action of an agent, 
A. The father was the only one working in the family, but A employed 
him in precarious and exploitative conditions. He had to work more 
than he could bear and eventually quit his job due to health reasons, 
leaving the whole family without an income. It is reasonable that agent 
A is the first one to be held responsible. We also have agent B, who has 
nothing to do with what happened but has a lot of power and is well 
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equipped to step in and support the family. In a rich society, the state 
typically meets these criteria. If agents A and B cannot do anything to 
help, then it is up to the mother to try to find a job, leaving her children 
alone during the day. But if she cannot find anything or finds only jobs 
she cannot accept for good reasons, she will be in a situation in which 
she no longer is able to provide a decent living for her children. In these 
circumstances, another agent comes into play: a person in her neighbor-
hood, who works closely with the father’s employer and who has bene-
fited from the fact that A exploits his workers and his profits are high. 
The neighbor did not intend to do anything wrong and was not aware 
of the schemes of his business partner, but he surely benefited; if there is 
no one else to turn to, his responsibilities are strong. The children them-
selves have the weakest obligation in respect to their own poverty. The 
two younger ones, aged one and three, obviously cannot do anything. 
The older one, aged ten, could work for the neighbors and support her 
mother and siblings, but from a moral point of view, this fact can confer 
only very weak responsibilities. 
 Three important things should be noted here. Firstly, in many cases 
more than one reason to be responsible can be applied. The state, for 
example, is powerful and has some interest in keeping children out of 
poverty. Then there might be an uncle that is well off and close to the 
children; he certainly ought to step in and support the mother if the 
state fails to do so. It is possible that the state might fail but the society 
has other powerful institutions like charities. Secondly, responsibility 
rises if more than one reason can be applied. Take a company that has 
the means to pay fair wages and provide good working conditions but, 
due to its focus on maximizing profits, exploits women and hence harms 
both them and their children. This company is more to blame and needs 
to shoulder more responsibility than an equally powerful company that 
makes only moderate profit because it pays fair wages but could do more 
in respect of better work-life-balance programs for its workers. It is again 
important to keep in mind that the responsibilities individuals have are 
attached to their positions within an institution. A politician has the 
responsibility to make the state and its institutions work in such a way 
that injustices do not occur or are alleviated; this may happen by trying 
to increase the working conditions and introduce a minimum wage. 
As a private person, her responsibilities are different and have more to 
do with paying a fair wage to her cleaner instead of exploiting her, for 
instance. Finally, it is possible to construct examples in which arguments 
speak against our weighting or in which the case is less clear. Such an 
example would be another very rich neighbor who is powerful but did 
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not profit from the precarious conditions the father was employed in. Is 
she responsible for stepping in even before the mother tries to work to 
make ends meet, because power ranks higher than closeness? We would 
agree that, in such a case, the rich neighbor has a responsibility towards 
these children and has to step in if the mother could provide for her 
children only by excessive and harmful means like leaving them alone 
and moving to another country for work. 
 3.2 Important agents of justice and their responsibilities 
 In the previous section, we tried to narrow down grounds on which 
agents of justice can be held responsible and presented a ranking of 
the grounds. A still missing but equally important point is to identify 
agents of justice in the first place. Some clarifications are needed before 
we can do that. One the one hand, we need to distinguish between 
agents responsible for doing something about the child being poor and 
agents responsible for doing something about the negative effects of 
being poor. These are different issues. We argued that child poverty is 
unjust because it leads to severe deprivations in important function-
ings. Hence, it is a state of ill-being and leads to ill-becoming; it is a 
major obstacle to developing important capabilities adults should have. 
But these negative effects of child poverty can certainly be alleviated 
to some extent without changing the poverty condition itself, at least 
if one uses a monetary definition of poverty. Think of the example of 
social inclusion from the previous chapter. Children in poverty are 
more likely to be excluded due to a lack of adequate transportation and 
because they are often stigmatized by other people, including their peers 
in school. Both aspects could be different without moving the child out 
of poverty measured by household income. In such a case, the harsh 
effects of poverty are alleviated, and the deprivation in this aspect 
might not even occur. Again, household income is just one measure for 
poverty in welfare states; measures like deprivation indicators could use 
access to transportation and being stigmatized as indicators for poverty. 
In that case, providing transportation and a change in the behavior and 
attitudes of other persons and children towards their poor peers would 
translate into a move out of poverty. It is also very likely that some 
agents who cannot do much about the poverty of the child can do a 
lot in regard to how poverty translates into disadvantages and depriva-
tions. A more inclusive health care system that provides free and low-
threshold health care might be combined with outreach social work. 
Taken together, these measures can certainly make a difference and 
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help increase the health of many poor children. Some agents may be 
able to do much about the poverty status of the child while not directly 
influencing other dimensions of its well-being and well-becoming. The 
employer of the father or mother, for instance, who decides to pay a 
higher wage and improve working conditions, aiming at more family-
friendly working hours, certainly influences what a child is able to do 
and be. Eventually such changes can move her and her family out of 
poverty, but the employer still can influence the health and education 
of the child only indirectly. 
 Since the relation between poverty and the deprivations discussed in 
Chapter 2 suggests that poverty is a very important cause for them, we 
argue that poverty should be targeted directly if possible. Alleviating 
the effects of poverty is like fighting the symptoms and not the disease. 
This in no way implies that one should not care about alleviating the 
effects of child poverty. Setting up more inclusive health care systems 
that directly target poor children is definitely a good thing. We know 
that they are a particularly vulnerable group and in need of support. In 
situations where it is unlikely that poverty can be directly tackled or in 
which it is foreseeable that progress on that front is coming very slowly, 
it is necessary to use all means available to counter what poverty does 
to children, even if they cannot be moved out of poverty. One must not 
forget, however, that the fundamental normative problem is that chil-
dren grow up in poverty and that there is a need for a systematic change 
to this. 
 Identifying agents of justice for child poverty is a task that should be 
informed by empirical evidence. The relations between different agents 
in the child’s environment and the way they actually influence her 
well-being and well-becoming is complex, and we have already indi-
cated that a focus on state and family is too narrow. A very influential 
theory that guides our specification is the ecological model proposed 
by Urie Bronfenbrenner, a psychologist who worked on child devel-
opment (Bronfenbrenner 1979; Bronfenbrenner and Morris 2007). His 
bioecological model aims to conceptualize child development based on 
an understanding that development is the change and continuity of 
biopsychological characteristics of humans over the life course, a devel-
opment shaped by direct and indirect interactions between the devel-
oping human being and her environments. Bronfenbrenner’s model, 
used in empirical work for more than three decades, is also applied in 
research that aims to understand the effects of child poverty and in social 
work (Eamon 2001; Jack 1997). Such ecological approaches are especially 
fruitful in concepts of child well-being and well-becoming, which follow 
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a multidimensional approach and want to understand the embedding 
of children in different environments and how they are influenced by 
them (Aldgate 2010; Graf and Schweiger 2015). Bronfenbrenner distin-
guishes five so-called systems: the microsystem, the mesosystem, the 
exosystem, the macrosystem and the chronosystem. Bronfenbrenner’s 
model is not a philosophical one; it is also not primarily interested in 
child poverty and not conceptualized to identify agents of justice in the 
sense explored before. It simply tells us what different kinds of envir-
onments are important in children’s lives, as well as something about 
how child poverty can affect the child through these different systems 
by affecting the microsystem and the direct interaction between parents 
and child and other environments in which the child is present, like the 
school, the neighborhood and social service. Furthermore, this model 
can provide relevant information for a general concept of justice for 
children by showing what necessary conversion factors children need 
to develop – hence for developing functionings and, once they have 
reached a certain level of freedom, capabilities. In a nutshell, such a 
bioecological model shows that children’s development, the very 
acquiring of any functioning on which later functionings and capabil-
ities can grow, is a process in which many different agents are present 
and where they have direct and indirect influence. 
 This ecological approach gives further weight to Young’s approach, 
according to which one must look not just at those who directly and 
knowingly cause harm and injustice but at the broader context in which 
children grow up to see whether this context is suitable and supporting 
or harming and disadvantageous for some children. In political phil-
osophy and most theories of justice, there is a focus on the state and 
its institutions (basic infrastructure, as one might say) or on powerful 
international and global institutions that shape the lives of hundreds 
of millions of people by their policies and actions. We have already 
argued with Monique Deveaux that weaker individuals can also be seen 
as agents of justice, in the sense that they can do something important 
to overcome an injustice. In general, we think it is very plausible to 
view both persons and institutions as possible agents of justice. Since 
all institutions are made up of persons acting within them, the attrib-
uted responsibilities are transferred to them as far as they are in institu-
tional roles. For example, if a certain company is called upon to change 
its behavior, the call is directed more at that company and less at the 
managers leading it. This becomes clear if a change in management does 
not lead to a change in the attribution of responsibility on that company. 
The people running the company are the ones responsible for its actions 
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but only insofar as they have roles within the institution. The managers 
of the company may have many other responsibilities in their other 
roles: being members of a particular society, living in a certain commu-
nity, having children, profiting from structural injustices or injustices 
they cause directly through their jobs and the like. The same can be 
said of politicians who are in charge of designing their society’s institu-
tions and also those of the world in general through an international 
agency in which they act and which they support or help design. If one 
understands agents of justice in this sense, the categories of power and 
collective ability seem to collapse into each other and become one. An 
institution is often powerful because it can coordinate the actions of 
many people through their being members of that institution. 
 Partially following this ecological approach, we distinguish eight 
agents according to their relation to the child. The agents are listed such 
that they grow ever more distant from the child in poverty in terms of 
direct interaction. This says nothing about other parameters, like influ-
ence on the child via indirect interaction or structural injustices or in 
terms of causing the child’s poverty and connected harm and depriva-
tions. We use “agent” in a loose sense and in some cases prefer to name 
environments and institutions, not particular individuals. In accord 
with what we said before, however, we always address the relevant indi-
viduals within these environments and institutions, since in the end 
they must start acting against child poverty. 
 The child herself. The child herself is an active agent interacting with (1) 
her environments and also influencing and shaping them to some 
extent. Children in poverty are not mere passive objects. From an 
early stage on, they position themselves within their living condi-
tions and must try to cope with them in some way, whether success-
fully or not. Participatory research has revealed many different ways 
that children try to do so (Ridge 2009). Poverty makes living harder 
for children; if it is very severe, it can kill them. It would, however, 
be wrong to deny them any agency when it comes to evaluating 
their condition or determining how it should be changed. We have 
argued that any justifiable theory of childhood nowadays incorpo-
rates a strong agency aspect that actively involves children in their 
own development. At the same time, one has to be clear that the 
exact moral status of their perspective has to be weighed by their 
age and maturity. 
 The family and close caregivers. The family is obviously crucial to (2) 
alleviating child poverty and securing justice for children. Child 
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poverty most often happens in the family children grow up and live 
in, and the condition of the family is a major source of the child’s 
ill-being and well-being alike. Furthermore, it largely shapes the 
future of the child and influences what capabilities and function-
ings can be developed and achieved. Early development especially is 
based on interactions between the child and close caregivers, which 
can hardly be replaced adequately. Attachment and love and care 
are needed for the healthy development and well-being of a child. 
Poverty can, as we have already shown, disrupt families and even 
destroy them (Barnett 2008; Goodman et al. 2009). As the exact 
meaning of “family” is still in dispute, the mentioned relationships 
of love and care can – within certain limits – take on different forms 
depending on the social and cultural context. However, the import-
ance of some form of family relationship for a child’s well-being and 
well-becoming is recognized across different cultures and times. 
 Friendship, leisure and neighborhood. This category describes all (3) 
the different agents with which, besides the core family, children 
in poverty interact in a nonprofessional way. This group is obvi-
ously very heterogeneous and encompasses close friends as well as 
neighbors, school peers and relatives. Although their influence on 
the poverty condition of the child is typically limited and they are 
not in a position to alleviate material hardship, they still exercise 
some influence. For instance, they are crucial for the way a child 
experiences her situation in terms of social exclusion and feelings 
of disrespect and humiliation. Children are often excluded, stigma-
tized and denigrated for being poor by their environment, which 
is highly stressful. Such experiences are likely to lead to isolation, 
shame and low self-worth, factors that make reaching important 
functionings and capabilities difficult. 
 The social and political institutions on the local and state level (e.g., (4) 
public infrastructure, health care, education). This group of institutions 
and persons acting within them is crucial for children’s development 
and well-being. Children in poverty are to a great degree dependent 
on the existence of public health care, education and social services 
in order to achieve capabilities and functionings. Without them, they 
are in danger of ill-being and ill-becoming in various ways, and poor 
families have no resources to take the place of a failing public infra-
structure. Therefore, they are the ones hardest hit by austerity meas-
ures that cut the welfare system. It is important to note that these 
institutions have to be inclusive and set up in a way that they can also 
be afforded, reached and used by those who need them. 
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 The economy and the labor market. Besides the public infrastruc-(5) 
ture and the welfare system, the economy and the labor market are 
probably the most influential institutions when it comes to child 
poverty, although children are kept out of both to a large extent 
in many countries. It is a widely shared conviction in many coun-
tries, especially in the highly developed world, that children should 
not work to provide for themselves, and up to a certain age it is 
certain they cannot do so anyway. The economic position of the 
family, however, determines the life chances of the children who 
live in them in many ways. Work, income and wealth, education, 
health, social status and power are interdependent throughout the 
life course, even before birth and early childhood. It is therefore no 
surprise that welfare and workfare are very close and that work and 
improvements to the family’s economic position are seen as primary 
child poverty alleviation measures in many countries. They enable 
families to provide for children without aid from the state or other 
national and international institutions and NGOs. 
 The community of citizens in a society. Every child is a member (6) 
of a wider community; in most cases, children are citizens of the 
states they live and grow up in. Citizenship is important for access 
to services and institutions and determines which rights children 
have on the national or local level. The citizenship of their parents 
or caregivers is equally important. On the one hand, if children 
and their families are illegal immigrants or have refugee status, 
they usually have significantly lower opportunities in the country 
they live in; they may be denied political and social rights. On the 
other hand, being member of a bigger community provides certain 
opportunities. In many states, the welfare system is supported by 
the majority of citizens who finance it, and there is a certain degree 
of solidarity between them. Whether or not one agrees that justice 
is dependent on such a mutual sense of community, it is certainly 
the case that citizens influence each other’s well-being even if 
they never interact directly. Prominent examples are tax systems, 
to which everyone contributes and which are crucial to financing 
the welfare system from which the worst-off profit the most. Other 
examples are political institutions: on the one hand, they might be 
designed in an inclusive way, supporting poverty alleviation and 
creating a sense of solidarity; on the other hand, they might opt for 
gated communities, private schools, cuts in the welfare system and 
the criminalization of begging, thereby marginalizing poor families 
and their children. 
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 The economic and political institutions on the international and (7) 
global level. The local and national economy and labor market, 
as well as local and national public institutions, are not insular 
and detached from the international and global level. The global 
economic and political architecture and the power of transnational 
companies to avoid taxes, to put pressure on states and to lobby 
their interests highly influence child poverty and pose challenges 
for the supporting welfare systems. Especially in poorer countries, 
poverty alleviation is directly financed and designed by international 
institutions and NGOs; international treaties and agreements shape 
such countries’ economic and social development and their ability 
to design and control policies in areas from health care to the labor 
market (Craig and Porter 2006). Hence, particularly in poor coun-
tries dominated by such international rules, child poverty is shaped 
to a large extent by forces external to their own political and social 
institutions. 
 The global community of humans. Humans share one earth, and (8) 
through the various forms of globalization, the connections between 
them have intensified. The global chains of production and trade, 
which certainly produce winners and losers, mass tourism across 
the whole world and a globalized aid system in which resources 
from rich countries are transferred to poorer ones in the name of 
charity are just three examples of how people living in very distant 
places can effectively influence each other’s lives. These connections 
are typically manifold and interlaced, making it difficult to isolate 
and specify an individual’s exact position in the overall “network”. 
Nevertheless, these relations exist, and their normative dimensions 
must also be considered in an account of responsibilities. 
 We now have eight different groups of agents that are obviously 
involved in the well-being and well-becoming of a child in poverty and 
her being poor in the first place. Each of these groups and the agents 
within them, such as companies, deserve a close examination so as to 
scrutinize their responsibilities based on the grounds we distinguished 
before. Unfortunately, this would go far beyond the scope of this book, 
and so we present only a first systematization and ranking. After that, 
we will focus on two agents, the family and the state, since they are 
crucial to the alleviation of child poverty. 
 High level of responsibilities. The group with the highest level of (a) 
responsibilities encompasses social and political institutions on the 
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local and state level (public infrastructure; health care, school, social 
care) and close caregivers. Based on our criteria for attributing respon-
sibility, it is clear why these two are so important. Within the family, 
parents especially are closely related to their children, influencing 
them heavily and having direct power to alter their lives. They have 
(or should have) a strong interest in overcoming the child’s poverty 
(this often implies that they themselves escape poverty). At the same 
time, the family is often weakly positioned to change the poverty 
condition because it is most likely poor and marginalized, a state 
that can be reinforced by health issues or related problems. Thus, its 
power has to be seen in the relevant context, acknowledging that it 
is often severely limited. The state, on the other hand, is the most 
powerful agent, especially if it is a modern welfare state. It can hold 
other agents and parents responsible and define what they owe chil-
dren. Moreover, the state can be said to be a major source for the 
existence of child poverty in the first place, because it failed to set 
up an inclusive labor market and a well-working economy in which 
everyone finds a decently paid and secure job. The state has a strong 
interest in alleviating child poverty as well, because it is founded 
around such ideas as equality of opportunity and justice for adults, 
to which child poverty is a major obstacle. The state can further-
more be interested in avoiding many of the functional deprivations 
connected to poverty, since they amount to high costs over the life 
course (e.g., in the health care system or the social welfare systems 
that have to pay long-term unemployment benefits to adults who did 
not get a decent education when they were young). Social and polit-
ical institutions on the local and state level are in the best position 
to help – if they are financed and equipped properly, as we assume 
here for argument’s sake – and they can do so without any sacri-
fice on their own. They can successfully support children and their 
families and can provide them with such crucial conversion factors 
as health care, education and public infrastructure. We believe this 
analysis still widely holds true for the states we focus on. However, 
we acknowledge that the state’s actions are limited insofar as it is 
embedded in wider international and global relations and institu-
tions. In fact, there is an observable tendency that many states give 
up some of their power to transnational companies, which are more 
and more in a position to blackmail rich states and avoid taxes and 
lobby to weaken labor laws. These are trends that must be observed 
closely, since they clearly have the potential to alter the account of 
responsibilities we are developing here. 
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 Midlevel of responsibilities. This group of institutions includes (b) 
the community of citizens within a society, friendship, leisure and 
neighborhood, the economy and the labor market, as well as polit-
ical institutions on the international and global level. The commu-
nity of citizens has only midlevel responsibilities that include the 
obligation to financially and politically support institutions and 
policies necessary for alleviating child poverty. They should do so 
to the extent they can without their own claims of justice being 
infringed. Citizens can have more comprehensive responsibilities to 
help if institutions fail or are not sufficient, as in cases of natural 
disasters. Persons interacting directly with poor children, like their 
peers, friends, neighbors and other persons they meet in public, 
have only midlevel responsibility, too. Naturally, this group has the 
same types of responsibilities as the community of citizens, since it 
is a subgroup of it, but there are some additional factors. As these 
agents are closer to the child, their direct influence is greater, as is 
their ability to intervene; therefore, their responsibilities have more 
weight. One very important obligation in this domain is treating the 
child respectfully and refraining from humiliating and excluding 
behaviors. Another is to keep the neighborhood safe and child-
friendly, not make it a dangerous and insecure place. Surely, friends 
and peers who are themselves children have fewer responsibilities 
than adults; they usually belong to the last group we will discuss. 
But again, the line is difficult to draw; with teenagers, there might be 
cases where responsibility is relatively high. The economy and the 
labor market are in this midlevel because of their important influ-
ence on the child’s poverty by providing families with decent jobs 
or goods and services at fair and affordable prices. The economy 
and labor market – together with failed policies to regulate them 
properly – are among the main initiators of child poverty. Political 
and economic institutions on the international and global level are 
often overlooked, and child poverty is conceptualized as a local or 
national problem – but it is not in any exclusive sense. Every state is 
embedded in the global economic and political regime, and effective 
poverty alleviation will have to include significant changes on this 
level as well. 
 Low level of responsibilities. The group with the lowest level of (c) 
responsibilities is composed of the global human community and the 
child herself. The child is clearly in the weakest position to change 
her situation, at least until a certain age. We would argue that older 
children, who have achieved a certain level of competency and are 
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therefore also allowed a certain degree of autonomy and choice for 
themselves, have a certain degree of responsibility for their choices 
and actions. They do not have an obligation towards themselves in 
the strict sense, but if they make deliberately bad choices that lower 
their well-being and well-becoming – like criminal acts and drop-
ping out of school – they should also face the consequences. Still, 
the degree to which adolescents should be held responsible is debat-
able. The global community of humans – we exclude here those in 
high positions of power – has only weak responsibilities towards 
children in poverty living in other countries. The possibility of influ-
encing their condition is limited, especially compared to the local 
and national public institutions available in all developed countries, 
about which we next speak. This does not mean that they have no 
responsibilities at all, such as to support change on the global level. 
 3.3 The family and the state 
 Having presented a first systematization and ranking of agents of justice, 
we wish to comment further on the family and the state. The first issue 
that needs to be addressed is causality and responsibility for the child’s 
being poor. The second is causality for the negative effects of child 
poverty and whether the parents are largely to blame for it because their 
behavior is an important mediating factor. The reason for discussing 
these issues is that if the parents are held responsible but obviously fail 
to fulfill their responsibility, strong intervention could be justified. We 
will then explore what the state and society in general owe parents as 
support for them in taking care of their children. 
 If the parents of poor children are responsible for their children’s 
poverty and/or for severe but preventable deprivations due to their 
poverty, the state has basically four options: to support the parents and 
help them become better parents and escape poverty; to take the chil-
dren away and put them in state care; to take the children away and 
give them to other parents; and as a preventive option, to make it less 
likely that poor parents have children in the first place. All the options 
are based on the assumption that the parents of poor children are not 
in a position to prevent and overcome their own poverty and that of 
their children, at least not without being helped by others. This assump-
tion is very important, because in most literature regarding responsibil-
ities towards children it is argued that the parents have to take care and 
that it might even be unjust to put the costs of care on other agents, 
including the state. In the case of poverty such a conclusion is not of 
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much help, because poor parents cannot do what might be reason-
ably demanded of nonpoor parents under the circumstances of a just 
society. As soon as a child comes to exist, she has a claim to justice; if her 
parents fail to provide for her, someone else must. Anything else would 
be unjust and cruel, since children cannot be held responsible for being 
born to parents who are ill adapted to meet their needs and claims of 
well-being and well-becoming. In this sense we take here a child-cen-
tered line of argument and are not closely concerned with the question 
of whether fulfilling claims of justice of poor children puts unjustifiable 
burdens on other agents. We think that it does not and that each and 
every citizen has a responsibility to support its state to realize justice 
for all children, whether or not the citizen is a parent. In the nonideal 
circumstances in which we live now, this is even less controversial than 
it might be in an ideally just society, where everyone has a fair share and 
would be expected to give something from it. Today we are far from that 
situation. 
 We begin by discussing briefly the relationship between parents and 
their children and the rights parents have. It is now widely acknowledged 
that children have certain rights and parents also have rights and that 
parents can make and need to make important decisions for their chil-
dren. Compulsory education is a case in which the state itself exercises 
a right to determine large parts of children’s lives. The tension between 
parental and children’s rights and the right of the state to intervene in 
the family is obvious. We take here a child-centered approach that argues 
that in this triangle children are the primary right bearers and parents 
have rights that flow from them. In terms of justice this means that chil-
dren have claims of justice towards their parents and that it is the parents’ 
responsibility to fulfill these claims up to a just minimum. Hence, we do 
not think that a property view of parental rights, which views children 
as the property of their parents, is appropriate. Under the premise of the 
capability approach, no person is the property of another, because this 
would violate the demand of equal respect. This is similar to an argument 
developed by Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift that argues convincingly 
that parental rights should be based on the children’s rights to be cared 
for in their interest – though maybe not their best interests, because these 
are hard to define and unlikely to be accomplished perfectly. There is no 
society-wide feasible alternative to the family as a place for children to be 
raised, although in thought experiments such options can be imagined. 
In theory, it is thinkable that a well-run orphanage might do a better job 
than any parent could do and that such a society would be more just 
in terms of equality of opportunity, but this comes at very high costs 
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(Munoz-Darde 1999; Schoeman 1980). It is very unlikely that parents 
would be willing to give up their children. They would sooner consider 
leaving the country or trying other ways to keep and raise their children 
themselves. The same applies to such ideas as redistributing babies to 
better (i.e., richer) parents as a generally used mean to secure justice for 
children. To deprive poor parents of their children simply because they are 
poor would be fighting one injustice with another. Some practical issues 
stand against such an idea as well, such as the problem that there might 
not be enough rich families who would want to raise another person’s 
children. There is also some evidence that suggests that the risk of being 
abused and mistreated is higher for children raised by those to whom they 
are not biologically related (Daly and Wilson 1999). Taking away the child 
is, thus, a last resort. Moreover, attachment theory suggests that taking 
away a child always mean harming the child; staying with close caregivers 
the child is attached to is very important for the child. Still, in cases of 
abuse and severe neglect, taking away the child is justified. This means 
that parents, even poor parents, have a right to act as parents only as long 
as they provide their children with a minimally decent life. A similar argu-
ment was made by David Archard in his defense of parental rights. 
 We have said both that parents’ rights are limited and that they are 
conditional on parents’ protecting certain of the children’s interests. 
Failure to protect those interests amounts to a forfeiture of the right, 
in the same way that failure to obey just laws implies forfeiting one’s 
right to freedom of association. All accounts of parental rights, in 
order to be plausible, have to make them conditional on parents’ 
meeting certain of their children’s interests adequately (Brighouse 
and Swift 2006, 103). 
 In sum, the rights individuals have as parents within a liberal society 
are the rights to bring up their children as they choose so long as 
they discharge the morally prior duty of ensuring that their children 
enjoy a minimally decent life. They do not have the rights of prop-
erty owners to dispose of their offspring as they would their estate. 
However they are not required, as liberal principles might seem to 
demand, to bring up their children to enjoy maximally open futures; 
nor must they do so in such a way as would satisfy a liberal principle 
of legitimacy. (Archard 2010, 50) 
 The tricky question in regard to poverty is if being poor falls below the 
threshold and if parents who can be said to be poor through their own 
fault should lose their rights as parents. In this case, it would be justified 
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to take away their children, because the harm of being taken away would 
be less severe than the harm of staying in the family. Poverty would 
then fall into the same category as abuse and severe neglect, which also 
count as legitimate reasons for state intervention today. In fact, empir-
ical research shows that children from poor families are more often 
taken away, and it has also been suggested that social workers are more 
likely to intervene in poor families than in richer ones, even if the level 
of neglect or abuse is similar. 
 We now want to discuss why parents are not fully responsible for being 
poor and why this leads to the conclusion that even if poverty should 
constitute falling under the threshold necessary to uphold parental rights, 
parents should be supported instead of having their children taken away. 
Most people in poverty are not poor by choice, in the sense that they 
wish to be poor. The question is whether poor parents can be seen as 
being poor because they made bad and wrong choices, which lead them 
to become poor against their will and desire. This would be evaluated as 
a kind of deserving poverty. The first argument that speaks against such 
a conclusion is that poverty is very often grounded in childhood, and 
the intergenerational transmission of poverty suggests that people move 
through the life course on a trajectory that is very hard to change. It is 
certainly not impossible to escape poverty, but it is hard to because of the 
many disadvantages we discussed, like deprivations in health and educa-
tion. The second argument in favor of our conclusion is the structural 
nature of poverty. The economic crisis of the last years pushed millions 
of people into poverty and made it much harder to escape it, showing 
impressively that the individual is dependent on the economic and social 
chances she finds. If there are simply not enough jobs available, someone 
will be unemployed, and if the economy changes in a way that transfers 
jobs from one country to another, the individual worker with a family 
and a mortgage to repay simply cannot move along (in fact, in most cases 
this would not help much, since it would still be too expensive). 
 The counterargument, that uneducated persons are much more vulner-
able to poverty, captures only one dimension and so must be rejected 
at least partly. Educational choices are in many countries made very 
early and depend on such things as available schools in the neighbor-
hood or the support from parents. Children cannot control them, and 
when they reach an age at which they can be held partially responsible 
for their educational achievements and choices, it is often too late. We do 
not wish to dismiss adolescents completely, but they are at least partially 
the victims of their circumstances and the environments in which they 
grew up, which makes it more likely that they will leave school early, 
152 A Philosophical Examination of Social Justice and Child Poverty
become teenage parents or start to work early in insecure low-wage jobs. 
Furthermore, education is important, but so are other factors – for example, 
health and disability. The fact that single parents are much more often 
poor speaks not so much against these mothers and fathers as it reflects 
gender inequalities in the labor market (England 2005), the undervaluing 
of jobs done mainly by women and the lack of economic recognition of 
care work, as well as the difficulties of supporting young children with a 
part-time job in an environment which does not have enough affordable 
child care facilities. Many poor adults have certainly made bad choices 
and are partially to be blamed for them, especially if they are respon-
sible for children, in which case their bad choices’ consequences fall upon 
others who are particular vulnerable. But all the knowledge and evidence 
about poverty in welfare states suggests that most people are victims more 
of their circumstances than of their bad choices. 
 This conclusion is closely connected to the second point concerned 
with the behavior of poor parents and how they influence their chil-
dren’s well-being and well-becoming. We saw in the last chapter that 
parents mediate how poverty affects their children. Two examples from 
research illustrate this point. An older study on the effects of severe 
economic hardship on children during the Depression found that 
parenting behavior plays a crucial role (Elder, Nguyen and Caspi 1985). 
The most interesting result, however, was that the rejecting behavior 
of the fathers had a significant negative impact on the psychosocial 
well-being of their daughters, a behavior related to the physical attract-
iveness of the daughters. Put simply, fathers treated their daughters 
better if they were more attractive, which led to higher psychosocial 
well-being in these girls. This means that the child’s development and 
her well-being and well-becoming were influenced by the economic 
downturn, and this had influenced a major agent in their lives and 
the interactions taking place between the child and this agent. More 
importantly, this interaction was also shaped by a characteristic of the 
girls themselves, although they had no control over it. In a 2002 study, 
Mary Eamon investigated the relation between poverty and antisocial 
behavior of children from twelve to fourteen (Eamon 2002). She found 
that physical punishment, lower levels of parental emotional support, 
deviant peer pressure and neighborhood problems all predict anti-
social behavior and that children living in poverty are more likely to 
experience these. The effect of poverty on antisocial behavior is there-
fore influenced by both the interactions within the family (parenting 
behavior) and the interactions with peers and with the wider social 
environment (neighborhood). 
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 Both these examples show how important parents’ behavior is in the 
translation of poverty into negative outcomes in other areas of well-
being and well-becoming. How much blame for the outcomes can be 
attributed to the parents, then, and can it lead to a justification of state 
intervention? Again, we argue that it is enough to show that parents 
are not fully responsible for many of their choices that affect their chil-
dren and that this suggests that the state has a responsibility to support 
rather than punish them. Parents living in poverty in most cases have 
limited opportunities – and capabilities and functionings – when it 
comes to improving their own living conditions and those of their chil-
dren. Lack of resources translates into a lack of freedoms in this respect, 
which becomes evident for such things as paying for heating, a better 
flat, moving to a different neighborhood or paying for repairs and special 
treatments not covered by general insurance (in some modern and highly 
developed societies, millions of children and families are not covered by 
any medical insurance). Trickier from a moral point of view are “choices” 
such as taking drugs or drinking during pregnancy, child neglect due 
to addictions or simple bad parenting (as in the two earlier cases). We 
make a much weaker claim here: namely, that behaviors are themselves 
partially determined by socioeconomic position and how one grows up 
and is socialized; this claim seems to be supported by some evidence now 
(Pinderhughes et al. 2001; Russell, Harris and Gockel 2008). The claim 
that at least some important aspects of the choices we make are socially 
determined is, we believe, uncontroversial. The case of fathers treating 
their attractive daughters better shows that. Under better circumstances, 
such behavior probably carries little weight or does not happen at all. It 
is hence something that is not under full control of these fathers, and so 
we argue that the responsibility should be at least partially shifted from 
the fathers to the economic downturn and the state, which was unable 
to compensate adequately. We cannot specify how many of the choices 
poor people and parents make can be attributed to factors they cannot 
control themselves, but we would claim the portion is large enough to 
support our interpretation that the behavioral influence on their chil-
dren’s life is not in their full responsibility and that as they have often 
limited possibilities to alter their behavior, they cannot be held fully 
responsible for it. William J. Wilson has come to the same conclusion in 
his influential study on urban poverty in the USA:
 This is not to argue that individuals and groups lack freedom to make 
their own choices, engage in certain conduct and develop certain 
styles and orientations, but it is to say that these decisions and actions 
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occur within a context of constraints and opportunities that are dras-
tically different from those present in middle-class society. (Wilson 
1997, 55) 
 This does not indicate that they are not responsible at all and that poverty 
is an excuse for everything. It is certainly not. Let us consider another 
example: a study has shown that the economic downturn of the last 
years increased significantly the cases of children suffering from abusive 
head trauma (shaken baby syndrome; Berger et al. 2011). It seems as if 
stress caused by unemployment and financial strain leads more parents 
to behave in this abusive and severely harmful way. In such a case we 
believe two lessons can be learned: On the one hand, poverty does not 
excuse such behavior. Parents’ responsibility is to support their children, 
not hurt them. On the other hand, if poverty helps us understand why 
parents act in such a way, it certainly implies that other agents of justice 
for children, mainly the state and its institutions, should either alle-
viate poverty and unemployment in the first place or act preventively 
to support families and parents so that they do not display this kind of 
destructive behavior. 
 Where does this leave us now? Parents are an important mediator, 
they are not fully responsible for being poor or for all of their (moder-
ately) bad parenting, and there is no really feasible alternative to them, 
since placing children either in state care or with other, richer parents 
incurs many other problems. Would it be best if poor parents did not 
have children in the first place? The state then would not have to inter-
vene, and there would be no issues of responsibility for poverty or bad 
parenting to begin with. There is actually some support for this claim 
to be found in the literature, not only with a focus on children that 
would not be born and then could not be harmed. We leave aside the 
nonidentity problem and do not discuss whether it would be good if 
no one had children, considering it to be always harmful. We start with 
the assumptions that being born is good and that children born into 
poverty are more likely to have a bad life, in the sense of an unjust 
life, hampered by deprivations in important functionings and capabil-
ities. We assume furthermore that the state has the ability to intervene 
and that it could alleviate poverty for these children by supporting their 
parents or that it could at least alleviate most negative effects of child 
poverty, limiting them to an extent that is within reasonable range of 
the risks every other child has to live with. Hence, if the state changes, 
it can secure justice for children having been born poor, which certainly 
comes at some costs the state could use otherwise if these children were 
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not born at all. Under these circumstances – and we think they more 
or less accurately reflect what is possible in all modern welfare states – 
the state is allowed to enable and responsible for enabling all people, 
adolescents in particular, with a real choice if and when they want to 
become parents. It is thus responsible for providing knowledge about 
reproductive health and helping them plan their parenthood. Again, 
we are confronted here with a very sensitive issue about which many 
different opinions exist (e.g., religious groups that argue that family 
planning is always wrong and the state should never provide manda-
tory sexual education). Adaptive preferences, or to put it more moder-
ately, unreflecting choices of younger adults and adolescents are an issue 
here. The reasons why young women get pregnant are multifold and 
can include gender roles, carelessness, lack of knowledge and the hope 
of stabilizing a relationship with a baby. Considering this, there is a fine 
line between education, helping people make good choices for them-
selves – this is the ideal of the capability approach – and manipulating 
or pushing them to make a choice that is good for the state. Under the 
circumstances described above, all adults and, to a lesser extent, adoles-
cents are entitled to become parents if they wish, and the state has the 
responsibility to support them in making that decision freely and with 
respect to their own life plans. The state has the further responsibility 
to support the parents on their way to parenthood, providing prenatal 
health care and social services in cases where there is an indication that 
problems exist, as for parents-to-be in poverty. Furthermore, the state 
certainly has the responsibility to support the parents after birth and in 
their efforts to be good parents; it is not allowed to compel poor persons 
to not become parents in the first place for the sake of merely sparing 
some funds. Reproduction and the capability of becoming a parent 
and acting as a parent – on the condition that one provides for that 
child sufficiently, with the help of the state, if needed – are part of what 
constitutes justice for adults. 
 Our arguments so far have been concerned with the claim that the state 
is not allowed to take children away from poor parents solely because 
they are poor or to hinder them from becoming parents. We have said 
little about the responsibilities the state has subsequently in regard to 
children born into poor families or living in families that become poor 
while the children are young; we also have not explored the responsibil-
ities poor parents have in respect to their children, besides having to care 
for them sufficiently – for which Brighouse and Adams used the term 
“interests” and Archard used “a minimal decent living”. We wish to use 
here an argument developed by Anne Alstott, who argues that parents 
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have an obligation to stay and no right to exit their parenthood; based 
on that responsibility, the state has the responsibility to support them 
in doing that. She derives the obligation to stay from an analysis of the 
importance of continuity of care. Put otherwise, children’s well-being 
and well-becoming are dependent, not totally but largely, on continuity 
of care, on having caregivers who stay and do not leave them. 
 No Exit is the flip side of continuity of care. We have seen that 
society expects parents to provide continuity, and it depends on 
them to do so. But when parents commit to continuity of care for 
their children, they limit their own capacity to exit, in two senses. 
Most obviously, parents undertake to stay with their children for the 
long term and not to leave them. But in addition, continuity of care 
requires parents to reshuffle their priorities: parents must strive to 
meet their children’s material and emotional needs, and they must, 
if need be, limit their own aspirations and forgo opportunities to do 
so. (Alstott 2004, 51) 
 Alstott is interested in what continuity of care, hence the no exit obli-
gation, implies for parents – namely, that they are limited in their 
autonomy, both in local autonomy to make choices (like going on a 
spontaneous romantic trip) and global autonomy, which concerns 
long-term choices. Such a parent-centered approach coincides with a 
child-centered approach that asks not what the state owes to parents 
but what the state owes to children; from this the parents benefit only 
because they are the mediators and conversion factors of state resources 
that cannot be directly given to children due to their limited capaci-
ties, vulnerability and powerlessness. Such a child-centered line of argu-
ment can even conclude that poverty-alleviating measures targeted at 
children benefit parents only as a side effect, since they are the neces-
sary mediators. In some policy areas, such an argument is more likely 
to receive support than a parent-centered approach that claims parents 
have certain entitlements or rights regardless of the benefits for the chil-
dren. The parent-centered argument, according to which parents fulfill a 
necessary responsibility towards children that demands certain sacrifices 
and in which they deserve to be supported, and the child-centered argu-
ment – according to which children are entitled to certain functionings 
and parents being the best mediators to help realize them, parents need 
to be supported because of that – come to very similar conclusions. 
 Parents have basically eight different types of responsibilities towards 
their children; they show a great overlap in regard to what we demand 
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of justice for children in terms of functionings they are entitled to. The 
first, as Alstott convincingly shows, is the responsibility to stay parents 
and not to leave, unless staying is either unbearable for them or would 
harm the child more. Parents should stay because children need them 
to. This implies that whenever parents make a decision that could affect 
their children, they are to take them into account and give them due 
weight. The second responsibility is to provide for them materially and 
give them decent living conditions. This encompasses a wide range of 
functionings: having adequate shelter, clothes, toys, time for play and 
the like. It is not possible to draft a final list detached from a particular 
context, but deprivation indicators that select necessary goods in a 
particular society can be used here. The third responsibility is to meet 
the health needs of their children and provide them with access to 
health care when they need it, seeing that they are healthy, develop 
healthy lifestyles and acquire knowledge about their bodies and minds. 
The fourth responsibility is to provide for them emotionally and let 
them experience deep attachments and security. Others have discussed 
whether a child has a right to be loved (Liao 2006); we see good grounds 
to deny that (Cowden 2012). An emotion can never be enforced by 
others – this is the only meaningful interpretation of having a certain 
right. But parents or other caregivers can be required to let the child 
experience attachments necessary for her healthy development. The 
fifth responsibility is to take care of children’s well-becoming and see 
that they acquire functionings that will help them develop important 
capabilities in the future. This includes being responsible that children 
get some good options in their life so that they can participate in their 
own development. Joel Feinberg has prominently argued that chil-
dren should have a right to an open future (Feinberg 1980). This claim, 
however, should not be interpreted in terms of maximization (Mills 
2003): No one can ever provide a child with a fully open future, because 
growing up and developing functionings and capabilities always closes 
the door to other options. The life course is in many ways structured, 
not only by parents but by the whole environment and the state (Kohli 
2007), and nothing more can be demanded from parents than to help 
their children develop into autonomous beings who have a broad range 
of options, selected on the available knowledge at that time. Parents are, 
thus, not to be blamed if they support a child in becoming a journalist 
and she later becomes unemployed because the news branch is hit hard 
by new technological developments; at the time, becoming a journalist 
might have seemed a very good option and life plan. The sixth respon-
sibility of parents is to aim for inclusion in social activities and groups. 
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They should help their children make friends and be in the public. The 
seventh responsibility is to give their children room for making deci-
sions themselves according to maturity and competencies. To guide their 
children, parents are allowed to prevent them from doing things, but 
children should be heard, be given voice and be able to decide (small) 
things for themselves from a certain stage on. Parents are responsible for 
letting children take on some responsibility for their actions. The eighth 
and last responsibility is to protect children from harm and dangers. 
This responsibility to protect, based in the vulnerability of children, is 
never fully comprehensive. Growing up and exploring the world always 
implies some dangers and the risk of accidents, injuries or other bad 
experiences. Parents cannot and are not responsible for fully protecting 
their children; this would be possible only by applying very restrictive 
measures that would rob the children of other valuable experiences. 
Parents should therefore protect their children, but exposure to poten-
tial risks is always necessary and justified within reasonable limits. 
 The parents’ responsibilities that focus on their own child also imply 
that they have good reasons to favor the best result for their child, 
even at the expense of other children. This partiality is unavoidable in 
parenting not only because of the special relationship between children 
and parents but also because parents have only little influence on the 
choices of other parents; it is reasonable for them to expect that other 
parents will increase the functionings and capabilities of their children 
even if this has negative side effects on other children. The state, on the 
other hand, can set up and run education and health care systems which 
provide every child with a fair chance and produce healthier and better-
educated children regardless of their socioeconomic background. As the 
state has to look after all its children and citizens, it also has the respon-
sibility to interfere with parents’ decisions and actions that either harm 
their own or other children. This leads us to propose a first systematiza-
tion of responsibilities of the state towards children in poverty based on 
our examination of justice for children. 
 At first, the state has to come up with a list of important function-
ings and capabilities and discuss whether or not these are all of equal 
value. We argued in Chapter 1 that fertile functionings should be treated 
with priority because of their positive influence on other functionings 
and capabilities (e.g., for their instrumental value). We further argued 
that this means that corrosive disadvantages should be tackled with 
a higher priority because they undermine many important function-
ings and capabilities. We discussed lists and methods to select dimen-
sion; this is an ongoing effort, particularly in regard to formulation of 
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concrete policies. We are confident that the functionings and capabil-
ities discussed – health, education and inclusion – will be on any such 
list and also will come out with a high priority. 
 Secondly, this means that child poverty is a corrosive disadvantage; to 
put it in positive terms, the functioning of being not poor is a fertile area 
and so should receive close attention. This implies two different tasks: 
the first is to alleviate poverty itself, to provide for the material well-being 
of child and family; as this can be done in many different ways, further 
scrutiny is needed to see which way shows the best results. The second 
task is to alleviate the corrosiveness of child poverty, hence its negative 
influence on other functionings and capabilities. Health, education and 
inclusion, for example, can be enhanced for children in poverty without 
alleviating their poverty directly. For example, if it is known that stress 
due to poverty during pregnancy affects the birth outcome, it could be 
a good measure to include a mandatory stress screening in prenatal care 
and to reach out to at-risk women and provide them the opportunity for 
counseling or other forms of stress management. In some countries such 
programs have already been set up and show positive results (Loureiro 
et al. 2009). 
 Thirdly, in regard to these functionings and capabilities, the state 
needs to further specify them and set adequate thresholds; it should 
aim to set them in a way that shows equal concern for each and every 
child, that minimizes inequalities in them based on such arbitrary and 
undeserved traits as being poor and that secures an equal opportunity 
for well-being in later life. It does that adequately only if it invests as 
many resources in children’s well-being and well-becoming compatible 
with its other responsibilities of justice to all its citizens. Here, again, the 
idea of a priority view is important: the state should prioritize children 
in poverty and help them overcome the group-based injustices they 
suffer from. The limits to this priority view are drawn by the justified 
claims of other children and adults, which should not be put below the 
threshold, and also by the supply-side sufficiency view, which claims 
that the state should not overburden itself. 
 Fourth, the state is responsible for supporting parents or other 
caregivers in their responsibilities, which we laid out earlier. It has to 
give them the means to be good parents to the extent that is possible, 
but it is also responsible for dimensions of justice that cannot be covered 
by the parents, such as equality of opportunity for all children. Parents 
can support their children in being educated and can also make some 
crucial choices regarding their education, but whether the education 
system itself produces equal outcomes is far beyond their control. If 
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parents or other caregivers cannot fulfill their responsibilities, the state 
is obliged to step in. The particular vulnerability of children and their 
limited capacity to take care of themselves adequately imply necessarily 
that the state – or if the state fails then a different agent of justice – 
has to substitute and provide for these children, whether it does so by 
seeking new guardians for them or by putting them in protectory. 
 We have derived responsibilities of the state towards children from 
the perspective of what is owed to these children in order to provide 
them with well-being and well-becoming. Because poor children most 
often live in poor families, the costs attached to these state responsi-
bilities cannot be shouldered by them. We have said much about the 
family and the state, which could lead one to the conclusion that justice 
for poor children is an issue concerned just with these two agents. This 
is, however, certainly not what we argue. The responsibilities of family 
and state derive from their relation to the child, from their power and 
interest in overcoming child poverty to support these children. Other 
agents have other reasons to be responsible; the state, as one important 
primary agent, can influence them much more than the family, which is 
faced with such problems as how the economy works, how gender roles 
are attributed and how to deal with the stigma of being poor. 
 3.4 Conclusions 
 In this chapter we have explored the issue of responsibilities towards 
children in poverty, focusing on the relevant agents of justice who can 
be held responsible for doing something about it. Our model is still 
vague, but this vagueness reflects both the complexity of the issue and 
the limits of philosophical inquiry. Based on the criteria presented, to 
attribute concrete responsibilities to the groups of agents we named 
would require a much deeper empirical knowledge. To some extent it 
would not be possible to disentangle relations and interferences. We 
argued that families in poverty are limited in their power and that 
parenting behavior is shaped and influenced by how these parents grew 
up and lived in poverty. It is not possible to disaggregate exactly how 
much of their harmful behavior can be attributed to circumstances 
for which they are not responsible themselves and how much respon-
sibility they have to shoulder. Being poor comes with a restriction of 
freedom, one that is, however, not total. It would be unjust to neglect 
poor parents completely as agents of justice; this would either degrade 
them to children, which they are not, or to persons with severe mental 
disabilities who are not able to make choice for themselves. Likewise, it 
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is not possible to calculate the responsibility of any given company, one 
that just does what nearly all others do: try to take advantage of their 
workers, make a profit, avoid taxes and so on. But even without exact 
calculations, we believe that our extension of Young’s model of respon-
sibilities to the issue of child poverty is a step in the right direction. The 
identification of different reasons for attributing responsibilities and 
agents of justice can offer initial guidance to coordinated actions neces-
sary to achieve real improvements. 
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